Mark

LOL must have been the Times paper round then, where do you want to get a caravan or chalet I might know someone who has :dunno:

Have you tried other places Richard, they cannot all have the same rules can they, are you sure you are not over 40 :schocked: :-D

Makes you go quiet :oops:

Don't know really kids are on holiday and the wife keeps hoovering (whatever that is) :?

This has just been on the local news here interviewing a survivor of a Swordfish torpedo plane after attacking these battleships 65 years ago today The Fiasco of "the Channel Dash" by Brian Grafton Between the departure of Peirse (January 8) and the arrival of Harris (Feb. 22), Bomber Command was under the interim command of Air Vice-Marshal Baldwin, commander of 3 Group. It was on Baldwin's "watch" that Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen humiliated the Royal Navy by sailing in daylight through the English Channel from Brest on their way to safer harbours. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had arrived in Brest in April, 1941, where Prinz Eugen joined them on June 1 after separating from Bismarck on May 24. Because of the threat to shipping they represented, their presence was of great concern to the Admiralty. Bomber Command had attacked them countless times since their arrival, without success, though 22 Squadron of Coastal Command had disabled Gneisenau in a suicidal torpedo raid on April 6, 1941 When the German ships sailed from Brest just before midnight on February 11, they did so with a modest escort of 13 motor torpedo boats and five destroyers, and with expectation of air cover for most of their journey. They sailed in foul weather ­ a sensible precaution ­ and they steamed into the English Channel. The Royal Navy did not see them. Coastal Command did not spot them (reportedly because of problems with their air-to-ship radar). The radar stations along the coast of Britain noted them and ignored them. Not until 11:30 a.m., when the ships were almost entering the Straits of Dover, were they spotted accidentally by a pilot with Fighter Command and reported to the authorities. Two hours later, at 1:35 p.m., the first aircraft of Bomber Command were airborne: by this time Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen were through the Straits of Dover. Between 3:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m., 242 sorties were flown by Bomber Command against the ships, though many aircraft could not locate them because of the inclement weather. In addition, elements of Coastal and Fighter Command, together with Fleet Air Arm "Swordfish", joined in the attack. So did the Royal Navy, with World War I destroyers and MTBs. No damage was inflicted. Only later did Scharnhorst and Gneisenau strike mines dropped by 5 Group aircraft and incur some damage. By daybreak of 13 February all three ships were safe in German ports. "The Channel Dash" was a tremendous blow to the prestige of the Royal Navy: the English Channel was, after all, the closest of 'home waters', and the RN clearly did not control it. The 'dash' was also one more all-too-familiar blow to Bomber Command, which demonstrated once again that it had no means of navigating or target-finding in poor weather and no ability to press home a strike against targets that were heavily defended (as these ships undoubtedly were). It is reasonable to ask how this could have happened. The first answer must be that the Royal Navy was husbanding its resources. It had been late in realizing the vulnerability of its capital ships to air attack and to plunging fire, but by early 1942 it had lost a number of ships ­ Hood, Prince of Wales, Repulse and Glorious among them ­ to one type of attack or the other. Despite the threat to Britain implicit in Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen, Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord, was unwilling or unable to commit his capital ships to a test of fire. Instead, he chose to leave the work to smaller ships and to the RAF. The Admiralty knew that the German ships were to be moved from Brest, surmised the move would be in February, and forecast that they would take the direct route through the Channel to Germany. Under the provisions of Operation 'Fuller', set up to counter the expected German move, Bomber Command aircraft were placed on two-hour alert, though on February 10, largely because of the bad weather, this was reduced to 100 aircraft on four-hour alert. Meanwhile, Coastal Command had issued an advisory stating that weather conditions would be favourable for a break-out beginning on February 10. At the same time, it was relatively plain that after February 17 the combination of tides, moon and lengthening hours of daylight would make the break-out from Brest much less attractive to the Germans. Once they left Brest, there is no conceivable explanation why Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen were not sighted long before they reached Dover. By that time, the three ships had been in the Channel for 12 hours. Granted, the weather was poor: that is why Coastal Command issued its advisory. But it remains a mystery how a combination of radar surveillance, Coastal Command reconnaissance and RN patrols could miss 21 ships doing what was expected of them at a time and place that was quite accurately determined.[1] Admiralty and Air Ministry were to hurl accusations at each other over the fiasco, though in truth there was enough blame to go around. As a measure of Britain's ability to make war, the 'Channel Dash' placed British forces under a frightening microscope. The Royal Navy had implied by its inactivity that it was afraid to fight, and the RAF had provided a demonstration that it didn't have the tools to do so. After an initial spate of newspaper reports ­ entirely negative and occasionally scathing ­ severe restrictions were placed on the press in the interests of public morale. Before the end of February, Bomber Command would finally catch up with Gneisenau at Kiel, inflicting severe damage and effectively knocking her out of the war. This attack killed 116 of her crew; the British had lost 127 aircraft in raids on Brest attacking the German warships in the months before the 'Channel Dash'. After the disastrous Berlin/Mannheim raids of November 6/7, 1941, Bomber Command had seen its strategic mandate drastically curtailed and its C-in-C sent packing. But with the events of February 12 ­ 242 sorties against targets less than 50 miles away, and not one hit ­ Bomber Command was at the nadir of its fortunes. At this lowest point, a new commanding officer was to appear. Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris ­ 'Bomber' Harris ­ was to be indelibly linked to Bomber Command. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Footnotes [1]. There are a number of circumstances in the 'Channel Dash' that are prescient of 'Overlord', the invasion of Europe by allied troops on June 6, 1944. The weather played a major role in both: the aggressor accepted marginal weather, while the defender assumed the weather too severe for action. In both cases, military leaders were absent: Baldwin and Saundby were at the Air Ministry on 12 February, and Rommel was visiting his family on June 6, while his subordinates were holding war games away from the front.

So sorry in bed today as I am on nights for two, waiting for the results to come in on the vote re:shirts, then we will have an iidea of who wants what, I shall enquire about badges at the same time, but it is Jack who has got the wallet :-D (back to you mate)

Now I have never heard of these M50 Onto as used in Vietenam by the American's but they do look good with six 106mm recoiless rifles on :schocked: http://i18.photobucket.com/albums/b114/MEasterby-Wood/106Ontos.jpg[/img]

Excellent job T where are you doing all this work its looks as though you have plenty of room there and why in Nato green ?

Isn't that plane a Curtis Kittyhawk

That comment from a post war man. Tcchh!!

Well its been well over a year now and I have just put my engine back in the jeep, hooray I tell my back it was worth it. Its been a long time due to work etc, but I now have a point where I can get going again and hopefully get it up and running in time for War and Peace if not before, all the best plans etc. Next job is getting all the bits back on the engine, making a wiring loom and doing the body and....................................sod it off for a beer. More to come :-D

PM sent matey

So Jack I gather from reports on here that you have been at this fitness lark a long time. [attachment deleted by admin]

Nice one Neil, respect to you :clap:

Hi Simon welcome to the show.

Hi Ken Welcome from down there to up here, enjoy the site.

Thank you Jack much appreciated forgot all about them :-D

Happy birthday Leeenfield. :beer: :banana: :banana: :banana: :banana: :beer:

Yes, :-D small and discreet as stories goes mate

I do believe that it has been paid back correct me if I am wrong, what we do spend on the Red Arrows could be spent on the forces on better equipment, would it happen?? who knows, what happens to air shows?? someone takes their place.

That does look nice Chris, must tug at a few heart strings

Hi Les welcome to here, enjoy :-D

Thats better Jack it will please Mr Blinkman :roll:

Better not be scanning a copy as Mr Blookman will not be happy as thats one lees sold

Yes!! and I think Neil needs a new hamster for the power wheel in his one